The 2015 Seattle Mariners were odds-on favorites to represent the American League in the World Series. They were preseason darlings buoyed by the recent free agent signing of Nelson Cruz and coming off a 2014 season in which their ace, Félix Hernández, had essentially salted the Earth with his changeup. They had a near-prime Robinson Canó. A nearly unbeatable bullpen. And eventually, as the season would prove, they had nothing but continual failure. The 2015 Seattle Mariners only succeeded in stumbling; this would lead to the firing of Jack Zduriencik, then in his eighth year as general manager. What follows is a hindsight evaluation of this decision.

When Jack Zduriencik was fired in early August 2015, the industry consensus was that this move was perhaps a long time coming. The 2014 season saw the Mariners get as close to playoff contention as they had managed in over a decade (falling just one game short), and watching the 2015 team collapse, just like the massively hyped 2010 team did, left people scratching their heads. The question was once again being asked: Did this expensive roster need to be torn down and rebuilt? Furthermore, the relative failures of top prospects Justin Smoak, Dustin Ackley, and Jesús Montero gave legitimate question to the organization’s ability to develop talent under Zduriencik’s watch. Recent graduations of Taijuan Walker, Nick Franklin, Brad Miller, Ketel Marte, James Paxton, and others left Seattle’s minor league talent pool relatively shallow. Seattle fans had reason to be antsy, watching two on-paper top-talent squads (‘10 and ‘15) fail to produce, while top prospects flailed and Félix Hernández continued to mow down opposing teams. There was a running clock here. The King needed a playoff team.

What follows is a lot of speculation, and of course a needed tip of the cap to the Butterfly Effect (not the movie) must be done. A grain of salt — a large one — should be taken with the following speculation. The 2016 Seattle Mariners once again finished just out of the playoffs, ultimately ending three games back of the Blue Jays and Orioles. Did they already have the talent in the organization to get them over that hump before Jerry Dipoto took over? It’s entirely possible that they did.

In 2016, Seattle’s offense was buoyed by a huge showing from Nelson Cruz, Kyle Seager, and Canó. Combined, they’d give Seattle almost 16 fWAR. Rounding out the roster were positive contributions from Seth Smith (in a limited role), Franklin Gutiérrez (see, Seth Smith), and Mike Zunino. All six of these players were in place when Zduriencik was in charge in 2015. Before the 2016 season would begin, Dipoto would offload Brad Miller, Logan Morrison, and Mark Trumbo. All three pieces would prove considerably more valuable than their replacements did on the 2016 roster. Especially so, in Trumbo’s case, who at the time was “dumped for salary relief” so that the Mariners could come to terms with Hisashi Iwakuma. Seattle would end up spending just $150,000 less than Trumbo’s 2016 salary platooning Adam Lind and Dae-Ho Lee. Mark Trumbo would end up leading MLB in home runs in 2016, with 47 dingers, due to a swing change he attributed to Mariners hitting coach Edgar Martinez.

On the pitching side of the 2016 roster, the M’s rode a breakout season from James Paxton. Alongside Iwakuma, the two anchored a starting rotation that featured a fading Felix Hernandez and the mercurial Nate Karns (who was acquired in exchange for Miller and Morrison). Dipoto would go on to curiously flip Mike Montgomery for Daniel Vogelbach at the deadline, a move that becomes more puzzling every year when viewed in the context of the Mariners being in contention at the time. Bullpens and back-of-the-rotation guys are fickle and it’s largely a waste of time analyzing any of their movements, yet dumping Montgomery still baffles. Acquired in exchange for Erasmo Ramírez, he had proven to be a valuable swingman. Beyond Montgomery, the anticipated churn of relievers continued in 2016. It’s pretty clear now that the bones of the 2016 pitching roster were in place the season prior. It’s hard, and fruitless, to compare 2016’s Wade Miley and Nate Karns to 2015’s Roenis Elías and J.A. Happ, but these backend starters combined for almost identical seasons, by fWAR, across the two seasons.

Ultimately, the 2016 M’s would miss the playoffs due to a lack of polish on their 25-man. Wasted roster spots on platooning first basemen and lost value at shortstop hurt them tremendously. These positions were already at MLB-level within the organization when Zduriencik was released. Even the eventual closer, Edwin Díaz, who was moved to the back of the bullpen in an emergency-driven development change when the 2016 ‘pen became swiss cheese, was inside the organization. Does the acquisition of Leonys Martin’s 2.5-fWAR season in center make up for these losses elsewhere? On paper, no. If you assume, and it’s certainly a big assumption, that these seasons stay consistent, irrelevant of what team these players were on, the 2016 roster was better off with Miller and Trumbo.

Another element beyond the 2016 season to consider is if Zduriencik had created a system capable of sustaining a multi-season window. Players like Chris Taylor, Freddy Peralta, Luiz Gohara, Ketel Marte, and Ryan Yarborough could have fleshed out a top-heavy organization in the following years. Dipoto’s quick-trigger on leveraging young, high ceiling arms to acquire known MLB placeholders makes it so we never saw how these players would have impacted the Seattle system. Hindsight gives us a massive benefit here, and there’s no possible way of replaying developmental steps that take years, but one wonders if the Mariners would have been capable of infusing their expensive roster with young talent. Hindsight shows us that ownership hit their spending limit by signing Canó , so getting this infusion of youth would have been especially useful.

Ultimately, this exercise is just that. Zduriencik had eight years to create a contender, and while he might have done that just as the door was hitting him on the way out, there’s no way of being sure. Dipoto’s quick trigger early in his tenure makes a mess of determining anything beyond 2016. Yet, one wonders if ownership’s decision to change direction due to a poor 2015 actually disrupted the harvest of a year’s-long crop. Certainly, a line of argument exists that the organization, despite national consensus, had more talent coming through it than what was perceived at the time. There’s no doubt that the Mariners have more minor league talent now than in 2015, but is the organization ultimately healthier, top to bottom? That’s yet to be seen.